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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
IMMIGRATION LAW 1976
INTRODUCTION

Immigration law is constantly developing and changing through
the legislative, administrative, and judicial processes. Each Congress witnesses the introduction and enactment of new immigration
legislation. Every year the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) revises its regulations under the Immigration and Nationality
Act. Moreover, immigration decisions seriously affecting the rights
and privileges of aliens continually issue from the nation's courts.
This synopsis will discuss significant recent developments in immigration law. Important immigration legislation of the 94th Congress, regulations under the Immigration and Nationality Act since
their yearly revision, and immigration decisions by the nation's
courts within the past year will be noted and analyzed.1 The scope
of this synopsis makes detailed analysis of each development impossible. However, interrelated developments will be discussed together, and significant trends will be briefly explained.
1. The period of time covered by these developments is as follows. The
94th Congress convened in January 1975. The regulations discussed are
those promulgated since January 1, 1976. Aguilera-Enriquesv. INS, which
was decided May 7, 1975, is the earliest decision discussed.

LEGISLATION

Enacted Legislation
The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976
The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 19762 eliminate one of the major problems to emerge since the 1965 amend-

ments3 to the act: the inequality between the Eastern and Western Hemisphere immigrant selection systems. Because the 1976
Amendments became law when this symposium issue was in its
final printing stages, 4 they are discussed more fully in the Afterword5 to this issue. The new act becomes effective January 1,
1976, 6 and is expected to have a major impact on Western Hemi7
sphere immigration.
The Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975
In response to the crisis in South Vietnam during the spring of
1975, several bills were introduced authorizing assistance to aliens
who fled from Cambodia and South Vietnam." Congress focused on
the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975, which
became law on May 23, 1975. 9
Transportation and temporary maintenance were two of the concerns which directly motivated the enactment of this legislation.
Within a matter of weeks, thousands of refugees were transported from Indochina and temporarily housed at various locations
2. Pub. L. No. 94-571 (Oct. 20, 1976), amending 8 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
(1970).
3. Act of October 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911.
4. The bill was introduced by Representative Eilberg (D-Pa.) on June
24, 1976. 2 CCH CONG. INDEX 4313 (1975-76). It passed the House on
September 29, 1976, id. 5037, and the Senate on October 1, 1976. Id. 4994.
It was finally signed by President Ford on October 20, 1976. San Diego
Union, Oct. 22, 1976, § A, at 9, cols. 1-6.
5. Afterword: The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of
1976, 14 SAN DiEco L. REv. 326 (1976).
6. Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 10 (Oct. 20, 1976).
7. The bill is also expected to have a serious impact on immigration
from Mexico. See Afterward, supra note 5.
8. These bills, their authors, and a summary of their contents are contained in 53 INTERPRETER RELEASES 282-90 (1975).
9. Congress concentrated on S. 1661, introduced by Senator Sparkman
(D-Ala.) on May 6, 1975, passed by both Houses of Congress on May 21,
1975, and signed by the President on May 23, 1975, as Pub. L. 94-23, The
Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975, 22 U.S.C. § 2601
(Supp. 1976), amending 22 U.S.C. § 2601 (1970). 1 CCH CoNG. INDEX 2520
(1975-76); 2 CCH CoNG. INDEx 4800 (1975-76).
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throughout the United States.' 0 This legislation quickly and effectively dealt with these two major difficulties created by the refugees' flight from South Vietnam and Cambodia. Although refugee
resettlement was a third concern motivating the enactment of this
legislation, it was treated less adequately than either transportation
or temporary maintenance for the refugees. Consequently, numerous problems have resulted from this unequal treatment."
The Single Parent Adoptions Bill
The Single Parent Adoptions Bill' 2 grants alien children adopted
by an unmarried United States citizen the same immediate relative
status 3 for immigration purposes as alien children adopted by
married United States citizens. This bill facilitates the immigration
of alien children adopted by unmarried United States citizens by
treating those children like children adopted by married citizens.
Contemplated Legislation
Undocumented Aliens
Several bills' 4 introduced during the 94th Congress address the
impact of undocumented aliens on the national economy.' 5 S. 3074,
10. For further information concerning these events, see L.A. Times,
March 23, 1975, pt. 1, at 1, col. 1; id. April 10, 1975, pt. 7, at 1, col. 4; id.
April 26, 1975, pt. 1, at 1, col. 1; id. April 28, 1975, pt. 1, at 5, col. 1; id.

May 10, 1975, pt. 1, at 21, col. 1.
11. See text accompanying notes 32-39 infra.

12. This bill, H.R. 568, was introduced by Representative Koch (D-N.Y.)
on January 16, 1975, passed by the House on April 21, 1975, passed by the

Senate on December 2, 1975, and signed by the President on December 16,
1975, as Pub. L. 94-155, The Single Parent Adoptions Bill. 2 CCH CONG.
IN

x:.
3533, 5054 (1975-76).
13. Since the inception of numerical immigration restrictions in 1921, the

immigration laws have exempted some groups from the restrictions. Immediate relatives are one such group. To qualify for immediate relative
status, an alien must be the spouse, parent, or child of a United States citizen. Immigration and Nationality Act § 201 (b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1970)
[The Immigration and Nationality Act is hereinafter cited as I. & N. Act.].
14. These bills, their authors, and a summary of their contents are
contained in 53 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1 & 264 (1976).
15. Several commentators have treated the related problem of the constitutionality of the various mechanisms for apprehending undocumented
aliens. See, e.g., Bernsen, Search and Seizure on the Highway for Immigration Violations: A Survey of the Law, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 69 (1976);
Fragomen, The Immigration Service Encounters the Fourth Amendment,
13 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 82 (1976); Fragomen, Procedural Aspects of Illegal

introduced on March 4, 1976, by Senator Eastland,"0 but as yet
unenacted is the most recent of these bills. Because the undocumented alien provisions 17 of the Eastland bill are similar to those
of the other contemplated legislation directed at this problem,
those provisions will be discussed here.
Because the possibility for employment is an important motive
for aliens to illegally enter this country, 8 Senator Eastland's bill
would punish employers who knowingly hire such aliens. 19 The
fundamental element of section 12, which treats this problem, is the
employer's knowledge that he is hiring an undocumented alien. Absent such knowledge there would be no violation. In addition, this
section provides that an employer making a bona fide inquiry into
the citizenship or alienage of a prospective employee cannot be
found liable.2 0 An employer who obtains a signed statement from
a prospective employee asserting that he is not an alien is also protected from liability.2 ' Moreover, this section provides exclusively

for civil penalties which may be imposed only after a due process
hearing before an immigration judge. 22
Search and Seizure in Deportation Cases, 14 SAN DiEGO L. Rnv. 151 (1976).

16. 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).

see 122 CoNG. REC. S2800-1 (1976).

For a further discussion of the bill,
S. 3074 also addressed many impor-

tant problems other than undocumented aliens. Its provisions on equalization of treatment between the two hemispheres were similar to those
enacted by the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976.
Compare the discussion of the bill in 122 CoNG. Rzc. S2800-1 (1976), with
the discussion of the 1976 amendments in Afterword, supra note 5.
17. 122 CONG. REc. S2800-1 (1976) contains a further discussion of these
provisions.
18. On this point Senator Eastland remarked: "My bill, recognizing that
it is the economic incentive or the lure of jobs that motivates most illegal
immigration, would make it unlawful for an employer to hire an illegal
alien." 122 CONG. REc. S2800 (1976).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. In providing for only civil penalties, section 12 of the Eastland bill
differs substantially from H.R. 982, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), introduced
by Representative Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (D-N.J.). Representative Rodino's
bill provides a civil penalty for the initial violation of its provisions; any
subsequent violation would be a misdemeanor, punishable by either a fine
not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment not exceeding one year or both for
each alien involved.
During the first session of the 94th Congress, extensive hearings were held
on H.R. 982. It was finally marked up as a clean bill, H.R. 8713, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975), and introduced on July 17, 1975. It was reported by the
House Judiciary Committee on October 25, 1975, but no further action has
been taken on the bill. 52 INxmi
mi RLEASES 277-79 (1975); 53 INTERPRTER RLEAs_.s 66 (1976).
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Section 12 further states that members or representatives of employment agencies or labor organizations who refer undocumented
aliens for employment, along with the alien's employers, may be
parties chargeable under the amendment. 23 Because this is a substantial expansion of previous sanction provisions, it is expected to
24
receive vigorous opposition from organized labor.
However, Senator Eastland in an apparent response to these objections argued that the combination of section 12 and section 2,
which allows employment of aliens when a legitimate need arises, 25
strikes a balance between penalizing those who knowingly employ
undocumented aliens and meeting the legitimate needs of American
employers. 20 This balance in no way undercuts the bill's second
major objective of decreasing the purportedly detrimental impact
of undocumented aliens on the national economy.2 7 Rather, the bill
offers a compromise between the job opportunities for resident employees and the needs of American employers. American citizens
and legal resident aliens would no longer have to compete with
undocumented aliens for a limited number of jobs. However, when
there are more jobs than there are available employees, nonimmigrant alien workers may be hired by American employers.
Finally, section 249 of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
which currently affords relief to undocumented aliens who have
maintained continuous residence in the United States following an
23. S. 3074, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 12 (1976); 122 CONG. REc. S2801
(1976).
24. 52 INTERPnETER RELEASES 67 (1976).
25. Nonimmigrant alien workers may currently be imported for employment only if 1) their jobs are temporary and 2) unemployed people capable

of performing those jobs cannot be found in this country. Section 2 would

delete the requirement that these workers perform only temporary jobs, and

it would further provide that the unavailability of unemployed people who
are capable of performing the jobs in question be determined not with reference to the entire country, but with reference to the locality in which
the work is to be performed. 122 CONG. REC. S2801 (1976).
26. Senator Eastland expressed this idea when he stated: "At the same
time that we seek to penalize those who knowingly employ illegal aliens,
we must also make sure that the legitimate needs of American employers
are met."
27. For a further discussion of this issue, see Chapman, A Look at Illegal
Immigration: Causes and Impact on the United States, 13 S w DIEGO L.
REV. 34 (1975) and Manulkin, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of the
Undocumented Mexican Alien Worker, id. at 42.

arrival prior to June 30, 1948,28 would be amended by section 11 of
the Eastland bill to advance the eligibility date a full twenty years
to July 1, 1968.29 This amendment is consistent with the traditional
practice of treating undocumented aliens who have been in this
country for a considerable period of time more leniently than those
who have just arrived.30
Amendments and Supplements to the Indochina Migration and
Refugee Assistance Act of 1975
The hasty enactment of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 resulted in the inadequate treatment of resettlement problems. Therefore, various members of Congress have introduced subsequent bills either amending or supplementing the basic Act.
Several of the pending bills deal with status and citizenship problems of certain refugees. One such bill would authorize the change
in status of Indochina refugees from parolees to permanent resident
aliens. 31 Another would confer United States citizenship rather
than mere permanent resident status on certain Vietnamese children and provide for their adoption by American families.8 2 Both
bills would greatly facilitate the resettlement of orphan and adult
refugees from Indochina.
The cultural and language barriers confronting the refugees make
assimilation into our educational system particularly difficult. In
28. Before complete relief is afforded, these aliens must prove that they
have maintained continuous residence and show that they have good moral
character, are eligible for citizenship, and are not disqualified from admission to the United States on certain aggravated grounds, I. & N. Act § 249,
8 U.S.C. § 1259 (1970). For a discussion of registry, see Comment, How
to Immigrate to the United States: A Practical Guide for the Attorney, 14
SAN DiExo L. REv. 193 (1976).
29. 122 CoNa. REc. S2801 (1976).
30. Id. There are definite indications that this bill will be enacted during
the present Congress. It was introduced by Senator Eastland, the powerful
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. In addition, prior similar legislation had significant support. H.R. 981, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R.
982, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); and H.R. 8713, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975),
covered the same issues as the Eastland bill, but final action was not taken
on any of these. H.R. 8713 is presently in the House Judiciary Committee.
53 INTE nEmTz RES.ASs 66 (1976). Furthermore, tentative action was
quickly taken on the Eastland bill. It was immediately scheduled for hearings, which were held March 17, 1976. 1 CCH CoNG. INDEx 2463 (1975-76).
31. S. 2312, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). This bill was introduced by
Senator Scott (R-Pa.) on September 10, 1975. 1 CCH CONG. IND=z 2106
(1975-76).
32. H.R. 4810, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). This bill was introduced by
Representative Steiger (R-Wis.) on March 12, 1975. 2 CCH CoNG. INDEx
3763 (1975-76).
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passing the basic Act, Congress did not anticipate the magnitude of
this problem. Congress failed to allocate sufficient federal funds to
assist local educational agencies in preparing refugees for entry into
the educational system. However, several pending bills would pro33
vide the needed funds.
The opportunity for employment in this country was a consideration which motivated some Vietnamese refugees to enter the United
States. However, cultural and language barriers heighten the difficulty that the refugees have in securing employment. Although the
Act does not deal directly with this difficulty, one pending bill authorizes the use of appropriated funds to remunerate those Indochina refugees who may subsequently be employed by the United
34
States Government.
Finally, a refugee may wish to repatriate when confronted with
significant status, citizenship, education, and employment problems.
Emigration from the United States presents difficulties just as serious as does immigration.3 5 Two bills would facilitate a refugee's repatriation by mitigating any emigration problems that might arise.30
All of these bills would effectively treat serious resettlement
problems. However, they are languishing in their respective congressional committees. 37 The basic Act was signed into law within
33. H.R. 8949, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 10877, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975); S. 2145, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
34. S. 2314, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). This bill was introduced by
Senator Scott (R-Pa.) on September 10, 1975. 1 CCH CoNG. INDEX 2106
(1975-76).
35. Most of the refugees arrived in this country with little money and
no friends. Under these conditions, attempting to repatriate is extremely
difficult. For a further discussion of this issue, see L.A. Times, May 18,
1975, pt. 1, at 24, co] 1; id. June 24, 1975, pt. 1, at 3, col. 1; id. Oct. 2, 1975,
pt. 1, at 7, col 3; id. Oct. 5, 1975, pt. 1, at 12, col. 3; id. Oct. 5, 1975, pt.
1, at 12, col. 5.
36. H.R. 6797, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). This bill was introduced by
Representative Harrington (D-Mass.) on May 7, 1975. 2 CCH CONG. INDEX
3874 (1975-76). S. 1626, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). This bill was intro-

duced by Senator McGovern (D-S.D.) on May 5, 1975. 1 CCH

CONG. INDEX

2075 (1975-76).
37. The status and citizenship bills remain in their respective Judiciary
Committees. 1 CCH CoNG. INDEX 2106 (1975-76); 2 CCH CONG. INDEX 3763

(1975-76). The various education bills are also still in committee. H.R.
8949 is in the House Judiciary Committee. 2 CCH CoNG. INDEX 5091 (197576).

H.R. 10877 is in the House Education and Labor Committee.

CONG. INDEX 4107 (1975-76).

2 CCH

The last action taken on S. 2145 was the ap-

a month of its introduction into Congress. Admittedly, the crisis
surrounding the abrupt ending of the Vietnam War stimulated this
prompt and compassionate response. However, for the refugees
now struggling to assimilate into our culture, the crisis has not
ended. Unless Congress enacts corrective legislation, Indochina
refugees, at a loss in our society, will continually face serious resettlement problems. 38
REGULATIONS

Enacted Amendments
Fees and Attendance at Final Naturalization Hearings
Minor changes concerning fees and attendance at final naturalization hearings have been enacted. Fees have been increased, 9 and
attendance at the hearings by members of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service is now mandatory rather than discretion410
ary.
Alien Student Part-Time Employment
Under the former regulations, 41 a nonimmigrant student who had
requested permission to accept part-time employment because of
economic necessity. had to establish that the economic necessity was
caused by unforeseen circumstances occurring subsequent to entry.
The phrase "subsequent to entry" presented problems under the
former regulations. It would have included the last entry of a nonimmigrant student who had been granted permission to accept partpointment of conferees on May 20, 1976. 1 CCH CoNG. INDsx: 2456 (197576). The employment bill is inactive in the Senate Post Office and Civil
Service Committee. 1 CCH CONG. INDEx 2106 (1975-76). Finally, the repatriation bills are also inactive. H.R. 6797 is in the House International
Relations Committee. 2 CCH CoNG. INDEx 3874 (1975-76). And S. 1626
is in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 1 CCH CONG. INDEx 2075
(1975-76).
38. For a further discussion of this and other enacted and contemplated
immigration legislation, see 52 INTERPRETER RELEAsES 34-44 (1975); id. at
277-90; 53 INTERPETER RELE sEs 1-7 (1976); id. at 66-73.
39. 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.7(a) & (b) (1976) have been amended so that a
charge of $5.00 will be imposed if a check in payment of a fee is not honored. In addition, the cost for filing certain applications, petitions, appeals,
and motions under the Immigration and Nationality Act has been changed.
41 Fed. Reg. 1887 (1976).
40. Prior to this amendment, attendance at final naturalization hearings
or other naturalization proceedings was required only when convenient.
Now, however, attendance by naturalization examiners and other members
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service at such proceedings is required. 41 Fed. Reg. 5110 (1976).
41. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f) (6) (1976), as amended 41 Fed. Reg. 11015-16
(1976).
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time employment. If such a student left the country subsequent
to being granted permission to engage in part-time employment,
the student's reapplication to continue that employment would not
have been considered under the standard of unforeseen circumstances subsequent to entry. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service has amended the regulations so that a student's reapplication to continue previously authorized part-time employment will
not be prejudiced by any short absence from the United States sub42
sequent to the original employment authorization.
Status of Aliens Adopted by Unmarried United States Citizens
The regulations pertaining to the filing of an orphan visa petition 43 have been amended to conform to the Single Parent Adoptions Bill.44 These regulations now confer immediate relative status on all adopted alien orphans, whether their adoptive parents are
45
married or single.
Exemption from Labor Certification Requirement
Under previous regulations, an alien was exempted from the labor certification requirement of the Immigration and Nationality
Act4" if he wanted to enter the United States for the purpose of
engaging in a commercial or agricultural enterprise in which he had
47
invested, or was in the process of investing, a minimum of $10,000.
This exemption was designed to ensure that the alien's primary
function with respect to the investment and the economy would not
be as a skilled or unskilled laborer, but rather as a genuine and recognizable economic unit which would potentially employ not only
42. 41 Fed. Reg. 11015-16 (1976).
43. 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.1(b) &.2(d) (1976).
44. See text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
45. 41 Fed. Reg. 11171 (1976).

Finally, 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(e)

(1976)

has

been amended to incorporate the holding of the recent administrative decision, In re The, 13 I. & N. Dec. 675 (Regional Comm'r, 1971). This decision
held that an alien dentist, in order to be classified as a member of the professions, must be a graduate of a dental school of some other country and
have been granted full and unrestricted license to practice dentistry in the
country where he or she obtained a dental education. 41 Fed. Reg. 1101516 (1976).

46. L & N. Act § 212(a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (14) (1970).
47. 8 C.F.R. § 212 8 (b) (14) (1976).

the alien and his immediate family but also other United States res48
idents.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department
of State have increased the amount of investment to $40,000. 49 This
increase was based on the argument that wealthy aliens are currently using the exemption to buy their way out of the labor certification requirement of the Act. ° The Service and the State Department suggested that increasing the amount under the exemption would eliminate this problem. 51 Nevertheless, this increase will
not necessarily stop abuse of the investor exemption. It will continue to be used by aliens entering the country as skilled or unskilled laborers. However, this abuse will now be considerably
more expensive. Moreover, if the investment figure is increased to
$40,000, the exemption's objective may once again be accomplished.
Contemplated Amendments
Exemption from the Thirty-Day Delay in Enforced Departure
Following Denial of Application
The current regulations provide that upon the denial of an application for political asylum, notification must be given to the Department of State. Thus, the department is provided an opportunity to
supply information favorable to the applicant. In addition, deportation of the applicant is not enforced for thirty days following the
date of notification unless a negative reply has been received from
52
the department.
There are cases, however, in which the department has notified
the Immigration and Naturalization Service that it does not wish
5
A proposed amendment would exempt these
to be consulted.1
cases from the thirty-day delay procedure. Enforced departure
would follow immediately upon a negative determination by the
District Director concerning political asylum.5 4 Thus, in these
cases, swift action must be taken to avoid immediate deportation.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

41 Fed. Reg. 10231 (1976).
Id. at 37574.
Id. at 10231.
Id.
8 C.F.R. § 108.2 (1976).
41 Fed. Reg. 8188 (1976).
Id.
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RECENT DECISIONS 56
Entry into the United States
56
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Supreme Court held

that routine fixed checkpoint stops and inquiries about citizenship
do not violate the fourth amendment's ban on unreasonable
searches and seizures. 57 The Court refused to extend to permanent
checkpoints the restrictions it had imposed on roving border patrols
in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.5s This decision, therefore, is a
retreat from the Court's recent trend of restricting the activities of

the Border Patrol. 59
In Martinez-Fuerte,the Court balanced the "minimal" invasion
of privacy involved in slowing traffic at checkpoints and briefly
scanning the faces of passengers against the genuine "public inter55. Those important recent immigration decisions not discussed are: Ri-

beiro v. INS, Civil No. 75-1761 (3d Cir., March 2, 1976) (what constitutes
gain in smuggling case); United States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.

1976) (search warrants for illegal aliens); Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 11
(3d Cir. 1976) (effect of judicial recommendation against deportation as
factor in exercising discretion); Bagasmasbad v. INS, 531 F.2d 11 (3d Cir.
1976) (discretionary denial of relief without determining eligibility); Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1976) (withholding of deportation
on political persecution ground); Brea-Garcia v. INS, 531 F.2d 693 (3d Cir.
1976) (adultery and good moral character); Castaneda-Delgado v. INS, 525
F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1975) (due process denial of continuance to obtain counsel not harmless error); Marlidis v. Sewell, 524 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1975)
(deserting crewmen deportable under consular conventions); De Pina v.
Kissinger, 75 Civil No. 75-414 (S.D.N.Y., March 2, 1976) (judicial review of
visa denial).
Administrative decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals play a substantial role in the development of immigration law. A detailed discussion
of those decisions is beyond the scope of this synopsis. However, for a
summary and discussion of the most significant administrative decisions
within the past year, see 52 INTERPETmER RELEASES 320-29 (1975); 53 INTERRELEASES 8-17 (1976).
PuiRET
56. 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). For an analysis of the decision, see Recent
Development, Alien Checkpoints and the Troublesome Tetralogy: United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 14 SAN DiEGO L. R-v.257 (1976).
57. 96 S.Ct. at 3086-87.
58. 422U.S. 873 (1975).
59. E.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). See also Fragomen, Searching for Illegal
Aliens: The Immigration Service Encounters the Fourth Amendment, 13
SAN DiEGO L. REv. 82 (1975); Note, Almeida-Sanchez and Its Progeny: The
Developing Border Zone Search Law, 17 ARiz. L. REV. 214 (1975); Note,
Border Searches:Beyond Almeida-Sanchez, 8 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 163 (1975).

est" in halting the flow of illegal aliens into this country. 0 The
limited intrusion was held not sufficient to counter the significant
public interest, and the Court therefore concluded that the checkpoints are constitutional."1
In Fiallo v. Levi,62 a United States district court upheld the constitutionality of certain sections of the Immigration and Nationality
Act 6 3 which extend immigration benefits to the natural mother of
an illegitimate child, but deny such benefits to the biological father
of the child. 64 The plaintiffs in this case were three sets of unwed
biological fathers and their illegitimate offspring. Neither the fathers nor their children could attain immediate relative status because of this special relationship. The statutory language excludes
from immediate relative status the relationship between unwed biological fathers and their children. 65 The court upheld this statutory distinction as neither unreasonably discriminatory, a denial of
equal protection, nor cruel and unusual punishment.0 6 So long as
60. 96 S. Ct. at 3084-87.
61. Justice Brennan strongly dissented, stating:
Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every Mexican
alien lawfully in this country must know after today's decision that
he travels the fixed checkpoint highways at the risk of being subjected not only to a stop, but also to detention and interrogation
....
That law in this country should tolerate use of one's ancestry as probative of possible criminal conduct is repugnant.
Id. at 3088 (dissenting opinion).
62. 406 F. Supp. 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
63. I. & N. Act § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (b) (1970) (defines immediate

relative); id. § 101(b) (D), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (D) (defines child); id. § 101
(b) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (B) (2) (defines parent, father, or mother).
64. 406 F. Supp. at 163.
65. Under the sections cited in note 63 supra, an "immediate relative"
means "the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States."
"Child" means an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who
is "an illegitimate child, by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status,
privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child to
its natural mother" and the term "parent," "father," or '"mother" means a
parent, father, or mother "only where the relationship exists by reason of
any of the circumstances" above. Therefore, these definitions exclude for
inmediate relative status and immigration the relationship between unwed
biological fathers and their illegitimate children.
66. The court declined to substitute its judgment for that of the legislative branch in determining the reasonableness of this classification. "It is
not for the judiciary to usurp the legislative function and replace the Congressional standards with its own." 406 F. Supp. at 166. The court also
stated that this classification does not deny equal protection because it is
1) not wholly devoid of any rational purpose and 2) not fundamentally
aimed at achieving a goal unrelated to the regulation of immigration. Finally, the court argued that although the hardship involved in this classification is considerable, it is not one which is forbidden by the Constitution.
Id. at 162-68.
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the immigration laws are not wholly devoid of any conceivably rational purpose, the court held they are not an encroachment on the
right to equal protection. 67
Various decisions have issued from the federal courts within the
past year clarifying the elements required for labor certification.
Unless an alien falls within a specific exemption, he may not enter
the United States to perform labor without qualifying for a labor
certification. 8 Qualification is based on two elements. First, there
must be no available American workers capable of performing the
labor for which the alien is qualifying. 69 Second, granting the labor
certification must have no adverse effect on the wages and working
conditions of American workers.70 Jersey Plastic Molders, Inc. v.
Secretary of State71 clarified the first element by holding that a labor certification may not be denied on the basis that there are unskilled American workers who are "available" and who can be
trained for the job within one to three months.7 2 Naporano Metal
and Iron Co. v. Secretary of Labor73 clarified the second element by
holding that a labor certification may not be denied on the ground
of "adverse effect" when an employer agrees to pay an alien on the
same wage scale under a negotiated union contract as is paid to nonalien employees.7 4 Moreover, this holding applies even when the
Secretary of Labor finds that this wage is less than the prevailing
wage for similar employment in the area.7 5 Finally, the Fifth Circuit in Pierre v. United States76 held that labor certification re77
quirements do not apply to aliens seeking political asylum.
67. Id. at 167-68.
68. An alien needs a labor certification to immigrate to the United States
unless that alien qualifies for a specific exemption-for example, immediate
relative status. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 2.5(b) (rev. ed. 1975). See also note 28 supra and I. & N.
Act § 212(a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a),(14) (1970).
69. I. &N. Act § 212(a) (14) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14) (A) (1970).
70. Id. § 212(a) (14) (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (14) (B).
71. Civil No. 74-845 (D.N.J., July 2, 1975).
72. Id.
73. 529 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1976).
74. Id. at 542-43.
75. Id.
76. 525 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1976).
77. Id. at 935-36. Along with DeCanas v. Bica, 96 S. Ct. 933 (1976), and
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 96 S. Ct. 1895 (1976), therefore, these cases
establish a trend within the past year increasing the rights and privileges
of aliens in relation to employment possibilities in this country. For a dis-

Deportation
Courts invariably hold that deportation is a civil rather than a
criminal proceeding. In United States v. Gasca-Kraft,78 the Ninth
Circuit affirmed an alien's conviction for attempted reentry after
deportation. As a result of being apprehended while attempting to
reenter the country, the alien was the subject of a criminal action.70
Valid deportation and attempted reentry were the essential elements of this action.8 0 Therefore, the alien argued that the subsequent deportation order was invalid because the criminal hearing
had been conducted without an offer of counsel at government expense.8 ' However, the court noted the right to counsel is constitutionally required only in criminal actions, and adhered to the con82
cept that deportation is civil rather than criminal in nature.
In upholding this distinction, the Ninth Circuit failed to note the
recent Sixth Circuit decision, Aguilera-Enriquesv. INS, 8 which indicated that the distinction between criminal cases and civil proceedings in relation to assigned counsel at deportation hearings was
outmoded.8 4 Although the Aguilera court found respondent had
not been prejudiced by lack of counsel, 85 it stated that fundamental
fairness requires that an attorney be provided at government expense whenever an unrepresented indigent alien requires counsel to
present his position adequately. 86 Prior to Aguilera, no federal
87
court had expressed this view.
cussion of DeCanas,see text accompanying notes 151-62 infra; for a discussion of Hampton, see text accompanying notes 108-15 infra. See Recent
Development, Preemption in the Field of Immigration: DeCanas v. Bica,
14 SAN DiGo L. REV. 282 (1976).
78. 522 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1975).
79. Id. at 150-51.
80. I. &N. Act § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1970).
81. 522 F.2d at 152.
82. A deportation hearing is a civil proceeding, not a criminal one
and a deportation order is not criminal punishment.... [C]ourts
have uniformly held in this circuit and elsewhere that in light of
the noncriminal nature of both the proceedings and the order which
may result, that respondents are not entitled to have counsel appointed at government expense.
Id.
83. 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975).
84. Id. at 568 n.3.
85. Id. at 569.

86. The court today has fashioned a test to resolve whether a resident
alien's due process rights require appointment of counsel. That test
is whether

"...

in a given case, the assistance of counsel would

be necessary to provide 'fundamental fairness-the touchstone of
due process'."
Id. at 573, quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
87. See, e.g., Martin Mendoza v. INS, 499 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1974); DunnMarin v. District Director, 426 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1970); Murgia-Meledrez
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Chavez-Raya v. INS 88 further exemplifies the civil nature of deportation. The Seventh Circuit ruled that failure to give the Miranda'warnings to an alien does not render that alien's statement inadmissible as evidence in his deportation proceedings. 8 9 Emphasizing the differences between a civil deportation hearing and a criminal trial and the fact that Miranda warnings are not mandated by
the Constitution itself, the court held the alien's statements admissi0
ble.9
Similarly, the Second Circuit in Oliver v. INS9 1 upheld respondent's deportation, despite her twenty-year residence in this country,
because she had been convicted of possessing narcotics. 9.2 The court
rejected respondent's argument that deportation under such circumstances was cruel and unusual punishment by distinguishing
deportation as a civil rather than a criminal proceeding. 93 Moreover, this rationale, although not expressed, was clearly indicated
by the Seventh Circuit when it reversed without publishing an

opinion 94 the district court's holding in Lieggi v. INS.9 5 Although
its decision was based on the peculiar facts of the case, the district
v. INS, 407 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1962). See also Rosales-Caballero v. INS,
472 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1973); Henriques v. INS, 465 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 968 (1972); Carbonell v. INS, 460 F.2d 240 (2d Cir.
1972); Tupacyupanqui-Marin v. INS, 447 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1971).
88. 519 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1975).
89. Id. at 402.
90. Given the differences between a deportation hearing and a criminal trial and the fact that Miranda warnings "are not mandated
by the Constitution itself", we conclude that, although the lack of
Miranda warnings would render an alien's statement, made during
a custodial interrogation, inadmissible in a criminal prosecution for
violation of the immigration laws, the failure to give the Miranda
warnings does not render the statement inadmissible in deportation
proceedings.
Id. For a contrasting view, see Fragomen, Procedural Aspects of Illegal
Search and Seizure in Immigration Cases, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 151 (1976).
91. 517 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1975).
92. Id. at 428.
93. Finally petitioner's contentions that her deportation constitutes
the infliction of double jeopardy and is cruel and unusual punishment fail, among other reasons under the principle so clear to
judges, however difficult for laymen to comprehend, that "deportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure."
Id.
94. 529 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1976).
95. 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. IMI. 1975).

court was the first court to hold that deportation is cruel and unusual punishment.9 6
In Lennon v. INS, 97 the Second Circuit did not strictly adhere to
the distinction it had drawn in Oliver between deportation hearings
and criminal proceedings.9 8 Lennon had been convicted of marijuana possession under an English statute which did not require
guilty knowledge as an element of the offense. The Second Circuit
held under these facts that the narcotics conviction section 9 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act did not preclude Lennon from entering the United States. In comparing deportation hearings to
criminal proceedings, the court noted that harsh sanctions are not
imposed in criminal proceedings when moral culpability is lacking.
Therefore, Lennon was not deportable under these sections of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. 0 0
Finally, the Second Circuit in Francisv. INS' 01 held section 212
(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act unconstitutional as ap102
plied because it denied certain aliens equal protection of the laws.
Under this section of the Act, those permanent resident aliens who
have lived in this country for seven years, have become deportable,
but have then voluntarily left the country and returned are eligible
for discretionary relief granted by the Attorney General. However,
aliens in the same circumstances who have not voluntarily left the
country subsequent to becoming deportable are not eligible for this
relief.10 3 Petitioner argued that this distinction denied him equal
96. Id. at 19-21. For a further discussion of the district court opinion
in Lieggi, see Recent Development, Deportation of an Alien for a Marijuana
Conviction Can Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Lieggi v. INS,
389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. fI1. 1975), 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 454 (1976).
97. 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975). For a complete description of the Lennon
litigation, see Wildes, The Non-Priority Program of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom
of Information Act, 14 SAN Dr-ao L. REV. 42, 43-44 n.4 (1976).
-98. Compare note 93 supra, with note 100 infra.
99. L &N. Act §212(a) (23), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (23) (1970).
100. Deportation is not, of course, a penal sanction. But in severity
it passes all but the most Draconian criminal penalties. We therefore cannot deem wholly irrelevant the long unbroken tradition of
the criminal law that harsh sanctions should not be imposed where
moral culpability is lacking.
Given, in sum, the minimal gain in effective enforcement, we
cannot imagine that Congress would impose the harsh consequences
of an excludable alien classification upon a person convicted under
a foreign law that made guilty knowledge irrelevant. We hold that
it did not.
Id. at 193-94.
101. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
102. Id. at 273.

103. I. &N. Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1970).
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protection because it created two classes of aliens identical in every
The court accepted this argument, holding
respect except one.'10
that the distinction between departing and non-departing aliens
was not rationally related to any legitimate purpose of the stat05
ute.1
Francis is significant for two reasons. It establishes a rare defense to a drug deportation,10 6 but more importantly, it is the only
decision in which a court has ruled a section of the Immigration and
10 7
Nationality Act unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.
An effective equal protection argument may now be available to aliens in other immigration law contexts.
Rights and Privilegesof Legally Resident Aliens
In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 08 the Supreme Court considered
whether the Civil Service Commission's bar of permanent resident
aliens from employment in competitive civil service deprived those
aliens of liberty without due process of law. 0 9 The Court utilized
104. 532 F.2d at 272-73.
105. Id. The court further distinguished this discrimination within a
class of aliens from discrimination among classes of aliens.
Fundamental fairness dictates that permanent resident aliens
who are in like circumstances, but for irrelevant and fortuitous
factors, be treated in a like manner. We do not dispute the power
of Congress to create different standards of admission and deportation for different groups of aliens. However, once those choices are
made, individuals within a particular group may not be subjected
to disparate treatment on criteria wholly unrelated to any legitimate government interest. We find that the Board's interpretation
of Section 212 (c) is unconstitutional as applied to this petitioner.
Id. at 273.
106. See Recent Development, Deportation of an Alien for Marijuana
Conviction Can Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Lieggi v. INS,
389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1975), 13 SAw DIEGO L. REv. 465 n.58 (1976).
107. Neither the Supreme Court, nor any court of appeals, nor any district court had struck down a section of the Act on equal protection
grounds. Cf. Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12, 16-19 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
108. 96 S.Ct. 1895 (1976).
109. Id. at 1912. The Court specifically stated it was not deciding
whether the President or Congress had the authority to promulgate the regulation in issue:
The question is whether the regulation of the United States Civil
Service Commission is valid. We proceed to a consideration of that
question, assuming without deciding, that the Congress and the
President have the Constitutional power to impose the requirement
that the Commission has adopted.
Id. at 1910.

a combination of a substantive and a procedural due process analysis. It first identified eligibility for federal competitive civil service
as a significant interest, and then it indicated more than minimal judicial scrutiny would attach to a deprivation of that interest. 110 Administrative convenience was the only legitimate interest the Government could propose as a justification for this rule."1 But the
Court found this insufficient. The Commission did not perform
with the requisite degree of expertise in choosing the classification
to facilitate administrative convenience. 1 2 In addition, the interest
at stake far outbalanced any hypothetical gain to be achieved by
such a classification." 3 Thus, the Court held regulations denying
permanent resident aliens liberty without due process of law unconstitutional. 1 4 As a result of Hampton, permanent resident aliens
will now be able to compete with citizens for the 300,000 federal jobs
which become available each year.11
110. The added disadvantage resulting from the enforcement of the
rule-ineligibility for employment in a major sector of the economy
is of sufficient significance to be characterized as a deprivation of
an interest in liberty. Indeed, we deal with a rule which deprives
a discreet class of persons of an interest in liberty on a wholesale
basis. By reason of the Fifth Amendment, such a deprivation must
be accompanied by due process. It follows that some judicial scrutiny of the deprivation is mandated by the Constitution.
Id. at 1905.
111. That one exception is the administrative desirability of having
one simple rule excluding all noncitizens when it is manifest that
citizenship is an appropriate and legitimate requirement for some

important and sensitive positions. Arguably, therefore, adminis-

trative convenience may provide a rational basis for the general

rule.

Id. at 1911.
112. Id.
113. Any fair balancing of the public interest in avoiding the wholesale deprivation of employment opportunities caused by the Commission's indiscriminate policy, as opposed to what may be nothing
more than a hypothetical justification requires rejection of the argument of administrative convenience in this case.
Id.
114. A dissenting Justice Rehnquist viewed the issue quite differently.
He found no problem with the Civil Service promulgating the rule in question.
For this Court to hold ... that the agency [Civil Service Commission] chosen by Congress, through the President, to effectuate
its policies, has "no responsibility" in that area is to interfere in an
area in which the Court itself clearly has "no responsibility": the
organization of the Executive Branch.
Id. at 1915-16 (dissenting opinion).
115. Id. at 1900. Hampton decided the issue of whether the Civil Service
Commission could bar permanent resident aliens from competitive civil
service. However, it specifically left open the question of whether the President could decree such a bar. Id. at 1906-10. President Ford has subsequently issued an Executive Order requiring citizenship for employment or
appointment to competitive civil service positions. Exec. Order No. 11935,
41 Fed. Reg. 37301 (1976).
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Mathews v. Diaz116 upheld statutory provisions making eligibility
for Medicare benefits contingent upon an alien's admission for permanent residence and upon his presence in the United States for at
least five years. 117 The Court analyzed this issue by distinguishing
legitimate discrimination between citizens and aliens from pro-

hibited discrimination within the class of aliens. 118
It decided the merits of the case in the following steps. First, it
recognized the executive and legislative branches were best suited
to deal with immigration issues.110 Second, it stated Congress had
no duty to provide aliens and citizens with the same welfare benefits. 2 0 Finally, it ruled that a challenge to the constitutionality of
congressional legislation must advance principled reasoning that
will both invalidate the congressional prohibition against Government benefits and support other requisite eligibility requirements
2
for those same benefits.' '
The Court ruled that the challenged requirements were not
wholly irrational. 122 Moreover, the challenging parties could not
substitute another standard whose reasoning would simultaneously
invalidate these requirements and substantiate itself.12 3 Therefore,
the Court concluded that the challenging parties

merely invited us to substitute our judgement for that of Congress in deciding which aliens shall be eligible to participate in the
supplementary insurance program
on the same conditions as citi24
zens. We decline the invitation.
...

116. 96 S. Ct. 1883 (1976).
117. Id. at 1895.
118. The real question presented by this case is not whether the discrimination between citizens and aliens is permissible; rather, it is
whether the statutory discrimination within the class of aliens-allowing benefits to some aliens but not to others-is permissible.
Id. at 1892.
119. Id. at 1893.
120. Id
121. Id.
122. But if these requirements were eliminated, surely Congress
would at least require that the alien's entry be lawful; even then,
unless mere transients are to be held constitutionally entitled to
benefits, some durational requirements would certainly be appropriate. In short, it is unquestionably reasonable for Congress to
make an alien's eligibility depend on both the character and duration of his residence.
Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. Mathews had the potential under the equal protection analysis

Government Estoppel
Detrimental reliance upon the conduct of another is one of the essential elements of an estoppel. 1 25 Recent immigration cases have
attempted to characterize types of conduct giving rise to an estoppel
against the Government. 12 6 The United States Supreme Court had
2 7 that absent "affirmative misconduct" an esheld in INS v. Hibi1
toppel may not be invoked to protect an alien in naturalization proceedings.128 In Hibi the Government failed to fully publicize the
special statutory rights of numerous Filipinos, thereby causing
them to lose their opportunity for special naturalization.12 9 The
Court in holding that this inaction did not constitute "affirmative
misconduct" failed to elaborate on the meaning of that term. 18 0
In an en banc opinion, Santiago v. INS,' 3 1 the Ninth Circuit heard
several consolidated lower court cases involving estoppel. Although
these decisions differed factually, all were deportation proceedings
against an alien who was either the spouse or child of another alien
qualified for visa preference under the Immigration and Nationality
Act.

32

The Immigration and Naturalization

Service had mis-

takenly admitted these aliens who were not "following or accompanying" the preference immigrants.133
A three-judge panel decided the Government's action constituted
"affirmative misconduct" and therefore estopped it from deporting
of Francis (see text accompanying notes 101-07 supra) to be significantly

expansive, but the Court failed to take the opportunity. The aliens' situation in Mathews was similar to that in Francis, and therefore the Francis
analysis and holding could have been equally applicable in Mathews. See
note 105 supra.

125. Equitable estoppel contains four essential elements:

(1) The party

to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct
shall be acted upon or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel
has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant
of the true facts; and (4) he must rely on the former's conduct to his injury.
18 CAL. Jun. 2d Estoppel § 7 (1969).
126. For a general discussion of the doctrine of government estoppel, see
2 K. DAvis, ADAm sTaATvn LAw TREATISE §§ 17.01-09 (1958); Berger, Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 680 (1954).
127. 414U.S. 5 (1973).
128. Id. at 8-9.
129. Id. at 5-6.
130. Id. at 8-9.
131. 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975).
132. Id. at 489.
133. The error occurred in giving them preference under I. & N. Act §
203(a) (9), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (a) (9) (1970), which states: "A spouse or child
... shall ... be entitled to the same status, and the same order of consideration provided in subsection (b), if accompanying, or following to join,
his spouse or parent."
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the aliens. 13 4 The panel distinguished Santizgo from Hibi by finding that in Santiago the Government had affirmatively misled the
aliens, whereas in Hibi the Government had merely failed to act. 18 5
However, the en banc court rejected this misfeasance-nonfeasance
distinction.' 36 Rather, it viewed the Service action in Santiago as
less blameworthy than that in Hibi. 37 Utilizing this "less blameworthy" rationale, it refused to find an estoppel.138 Therefore, it
also avoided giving definition to the term "affirmative miscon39
duct."1
However, the Ninth Circuit in Sun I Yoo v. INS140 found "affirmative misconduct" when the Service delayed over a year in adjudicating an alien's labor certification and therefore made that
alien's immigration impossible. 14 ' The Service contended that an
42
estoppel was barred under Hibi and Santiago.1
In distinguishing
those cases, this court finally articulated principles for determining
what constitutes "affirmative misconduct." It stated that in Hibi
134. Santiago v. INS, Civil No. 73-2497 (9th Cir., March 4, 1975) (A copy

of this unreported opinion is on file at the San Diego Law Review.).

135. Id.
136. That term, as well as the use in Hibi of a quotation from Utah
Power & Light Co. v. United States concerning "neglect of duty,"
suggests that a distinction might be drawn between nonfeasance
and misfeasance. But these are slippery terms. The two "failures"
in Hibi can be viewed as either, a point which Mr. Justice Douglas
made in characterizing the governmental conduct there as a "deliberate effort." The same semantic problem exists here. There was
alleged nonfeasance in the failure to inform or inquire as well as
alleged misfeasance in the act of admission. Misfeasance is particularly stressed in the case of petitioner Khan for the immigration
officer there knew that Khan's father remained in Pakistan. But
it is obvious to us that the central complaint of each petitioner is
not the act of admission but the failure to inform or inquire. This
is equally true in the case of Khan who, in attempting to show
reliance, argues that the immigration officer failed to tell him that
his visa was invalid. We therefore weigh these failures against
those in Hibi. Only if they are more blameworthy are we entitled
to depart from its teaching.
526 F.2d at 493.
137. If there was governmental '"misconduct" here it is of less serious
nature than that in Hibi. Likewise the result of the Government's
failures here is less serious. Hibi lost his opportunity, granted by
Act of Congress, to be naturalized as a United States citizen.
Id.
138. Id.
139. See note 130 supra.
140. 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976).
141. Id. at 1329.
142. Id. at 1328.

the petitioner could have taken more affirmative action to learn of
his rights, whereas Yoo had completed all the Service procedures
for acquiring his labor certification. 143 It distinguished Santiago by
stating that there the Service's failure to properly inform the aliens
was justifiable because of the hectic atmosphere in admitting numerous aliens, whereas here the Service had over a year to process
Yoo's application.144 The court therefore held Yoo was entitled to
an estoppel because he had exercised due diligence and the Service
had breached its statutory duty, thus depriving Yoo of immigrant
status. It stated:
Immigration agents may have no duty to inform aliens of matters
which the aliens have primary responsibility for knowing and could
discover through the application of due diligence, but once an alien
has gathered and supplied all relevant information and has fulfilled all requirements, INS officials are under a duty to accord him
within5 a reasonable time the status to which he is entitled by
law.14

Although Cornie7-Rodriguez v. INS 1 46 was decided before Sun IL

Yoo, it illustrates Sun I Yoo's principles. In Corniel-Rodriguez, a
consular official's failure to comply with state department regulations requiring a warning to a visa applicant that her marriage prior
to entering the United States would undermine the validity of her
immigrant visa constituted "affirmative misconduct" and gave rise
to an estoppel.' 47 This failure resulted in the loss of petitioner's
preference category.' 4 8 Although the court's decision was based on
the equities of the case, it could have reached its result by utilizing
Sun Ii Yoo's principles. The petitioner had exercised due diligence,
and the consular official had breached his statutory duty.
Sun Ii Yoo and Corniel-Rodriguez indicate "affirmative misconduct" occurs when an alien has prepared for entry into this country
with due diligence and the Service or other Government agency unjustifiably fails to perform its statutory duty to properly complete
that entry. This gives rise to an estoppel. However, Santiago dem-

onstrates that if the Government commits a good faith breach of its
statutory duty, even though an alien has performed with. due dili-

gence, an estoppel may not arise.
Whether the Supreme Court will accept these lower court characterizations is an unanswered question. In Hibi the Government
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. n.4.
Id.
Id.
632 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 307.
Id. at 303-04.
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conspicuously failed to publicize the aliens' special statutory right
to naturalization, causing them to lose this right. However, the
normal procedure for naturalization remained open to them. Nevertheless, the Court held the Government's unjustifiable failure to
fully publicize the aliens' statutory rights did not constitute "affirmative misconduct." Because an unjustifiable breach of a statutory duty was an essential fact giving rise to an estoppel in Sun
It Yoo and Corniel-Rodriguez, Hibi seems inconsistent with these
cases. However, Hibi can be distinguished on two facts. First, the
aliens did not investigate their potential rights with due diligence.
An estoppel was granted in the lower court cases only when the
due diligence element was present. More importantly, the aliens
in Hibi lost only their special right to naturalization. They were
still able to naturalize under the normal procedure. The unjustifiable mistake by the Government did not cause them irreparable
harm. However, the mistake by the Government in each of the
lower court cases did cause irreparable harm. In each instance the
aliens lost their only chance to enter the country. While not present in Hibi, due diligence and irreparable harm were essential facts
in the lower court cases. It is therefore arguable that the Supreme
Court will accept these lower court characterizations because they
14 9
can be distinguished from Hibi.
149. The question of whether an estoppel will arise when an alien fails
to act diligently, the Government unjustifiably breaches a statutory duty,
and the alien is irreparably harmed also remains unanswered. The lower
court cases included due diligence, and Hibi did not include irreparable
harm.

An estoppel would probably arise in a case involving these three elements
if the irreparable harm was caused by the Government and not by the alien.
This could occur only if the alien had exercised due diligence and if he

had been irreparably harmed. For example, due diligence would not have
discovered a regulation which the Government was under a duty to disclose.
In these circumstances, Sun I Yoo and Coniel-Rodriguez would support
an estoppel because there is little difference between exercising due diligence which does not protect and not exercising due diligence which would
not protect. In each instance the Government's unjustifiable failure to perform a statutory duty irreparably harms the alien.
Whether an estoppel will arise when both the Government and the alien
cause such harm is less clear. Sun I Yoo and Corniel-Rodriguez will not
support an estoppel because in each of those cases the alien was harmed
solely by the Government. However, Hibi will not prevent an estoppel because there the alien was not irreparably harmed, whereas under these facts
the alien is so harmed. None of these cases controls this issue. Therefore,
a court would probably determine which party was most responsible for

Alien Employment and FederalPreemption
In DeCanas v. Bica 5 ° the Supreme Court upheld section 2805 of
the California Labor Code, which prohibits an employer from knowingly employing an undocumented alien if that employment would
adversely affect lawful resident workers."'r A California court of
5 2 by Congress's
appeal had held that section 2805 was preempted'
15 3
immigration.
regulate
exclusive power to
However, the Supreme Court declared that not every statute
which affects aliens is necessarily a regulation of immigration and
that the California statute was not of this type. 5 4 Moreover, the
Court found authority for this statute under the state police power. 55 Therefore, it concluded that nothing in the enactment, scope,
and detail of the Immigration and Nationality Act indicated that
Congress intended to preempt' 5 6 the states' power to regulate the
57
employment relationship covered by this statute.'
A statute may be held preempted because its operation is an obstacle to the objectives of congressional legislation.'5 s The Court
chose not to address this issue for two reasons. First, the California court of appeal decision did not address it. Second, the
issue involves construction of section 2805 and the relationship
of certain regulations promulgated under the statute. 1 9 The Court
concluded these were questions which the California courts should
the irreparable harm and allow an estoppel when the Government was most
responsible, but disallow an estoppel when the alien was most responsible.
150. 96 S. Ct. at 933 (1976). For an analysis of the case, see Recent Development, Preemption in the Field of Immigration, DeCanas v. Bica, 14
SAN Dmao L. REv. 282 (1976).
151. Id. at 941.
152. For a detailed discussion of the doctrine of preemption and how it
relates to De Canas, see Berke, The Doctrine of Preemption and the Illegal
Alien: A Case for State Regulation and a Uniform Theory of Preemption,
13 SAN DrEGo L. REV. 166 (1975).
153. DeCanas v. Bica, 40 Cal. App. 3d 976, 979, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444, 446
(1974).
154. 96 S. Ct. at 937.
155. The Court compared the statute to other instances of the broad authority which states possess under their police powers in such areas as child
labor laws, minimum wage laws, occupational health and safety acts, and
workmen compensation acts. Id.
156. For a general discussion of the doctrine of preemption, see Hirsch,
Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515; Note,
The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 CoLum. L. Ray. 623 (1975).
157. 96 S. Ct. at 940.
158. See note 156 supra.
159. 96 S. Ct. at 940-41.
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decide. 160 It therefore reversed and remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with its opinion.161
DeCanas substantially affects undocumented aliens, legal resident aliens, and American employers. The possibility of employment in California and in other states which enact such legislation
will be curtailed for undocumented aliens. Therefore, more jobs
will be available for legal resident aliens. Furthermore, these legal
resident aliens will be able to bargain more securely with their
American employers for better wages and working conditions because they will no longer be threatened by replacement with undocumented aliens.
CONCLUSION

No dpfinite trend emerges from recent legislative, administrative,
and judicial developments. They both expand and contract the
rights and privileges of aliens. However, the balance seems tipped
toward contraction. Martinez-Fuerteis a striking example of infringement upon the rights and privileges of aliens. DeCanas,
Mathews, and the reversal of Lieggi are further examples of infringement which overshadow expansive developments like Hampton and the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of
1975. In sum, aliens have lost more than they have gained from recent immigration developments.
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